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Abstract
In developing economies, health shocks play a significant role in instigating and sustaining poverty. The
impact of high catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditure also fosters a culture in which people decide not
to use services because they cannot afford either the direct costs, such as for health check-ups or consultations,
medicines or laboratory diagnostic tests, or the indirect costs, such as transportation to the care provider or
special food. The objective of this research is to investigate the potential role of voluntary health insurance in
India, particularly through a micro-finance framework to reach the most destitute, bottom income quintiles of
the population. Consumer Expenditure and Healthcare and Morbidity data from the National Sample Survey
Organization of India is used to analyze mean and variance of health spending, projected risk premia, and
variables that may predict levels of health spending. Insurance for institutional health spending is potentially
feasible given current market demand across income quintiles, and sustainability of microinsurance offerings
depends on increasing population reach as well as efficient delivery.
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Abstract 
In developing economies, health shocks play a significant role in instigating and sustaining poverty.  The 
impact of high catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditure also fosters a culture in which people 
decide not to use services because they cannot afford either the direct costs, such as for health check-
ups or consultations, medicines or laboratory diagnostic tests, or the indirect costs, such as 
transportation to the care provider or special food.  The objective of this research is to investigate the 
potential role of voluntary health insurance in India, particularly through a micro-finance framework to 
reach the most destitute, bottom income quintiles of the population.  Consumer Expenditure and 
Healthcare and Morbidity data from the National Sample Survey Organization of India is used to analyze 
mean and variance of health spending, projected risk premia, and variables that may predict levels of 
health spending.  Insurance for institutional health spending is potentially feasible given current market 
demand across income quintiles, and sustainability of microinsurance offerings depends on increasing 
population reach as well as efficient delivery.   
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Introduction 
Every year, an estimated 25 million households — more than 100 million people — are plunged 
into poverty when they or their relatives become ill and they must struggle to pay for health-care 
services out of their own pockets, according to the 2006 World Health Organization bulletin on health 
care financing in developing countries (Braine, 2006).  The goal of micro health insurance is to improve 
the financial protection of the poor uninsured populations in developing countries against excessive 
health expenditures.  The impact of high catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditure also fosters a 
culture in which people decide not to use services because they cannot afford either the direct costs, 
such as for health check-ups or consultations, medicines or laboratory diagnostic tests, or the indirect 
costs, such as transportation to the care provider or special food (Schieber, Gottret, Fleisher, Leive, 
2007).  Furthermore, as a result, households can sink further into poverty due to the work loss as a 
result of illness.   
Microinsurance for health has shown promise in being able to provide catastrophic health 
protection for the poor families in developing economies, and it is generally offered through micro-
finance institutions (MFI) that also offer other microcredit loans to individuals for small business 
development (Dror et al. 2009).  Due to lack of baseline and follow-up data collection, the success of 
micro health insurance has generally been equated with the household’s ability to repay other 
microcredit loans, and remain financially stable (Dror & Jacquier, 1999).   
Research Focus 
The focus of the research is to gauge the market for health insurance in India, particularly for 
chronic and catastrophic health care benefits, through a micro-insurance model.  The micro-insurance 
model in particular should theoretically facilitate access to care and ability to pay among the lower 
income quintiles in a country’s population.  It is hypothesized that micro-insurance can significantly 
decrease the currently high out-of-pocket health expenditures and serve to smooth risk and spending 
levels among the target community populations.   
Health Insurance in Developing Economies 
Community-financing schemes as micro health insurance have developed as a result of the 
context of two main failures in developing countries, in terms of catering to disadvantaged populations 
(Preker et al., 2001).  Firstly, most developing countries experience a government failure to collect taxes 
and organize public finance, which in turn can provide social protection for disadvantaged populations.  
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In addition, governments fail to employ oversight of the health sector in general, particularly in terms of 
the lack of health care supply, both professionals and infrastructure, in rural areas where a large 
proportion of the population reside.  Secondly, there is the market failure on the economic end to 
establish a functional exchange between supply and demand, due in part because of the gap between 
needs, demand, and ability to pay, which in turn leads to a lower level of health care supplied (Schieber 
& Maeda, 1997).  It is also in part due to the prevalence of nonmonetary transactions in the informal 
sector of the economy, particularly in rural, agriculturally-oriented regions (Schieber et al., 2007).  In 
India, approximately 78% of total medical spending is out of pocket, according to the 2005 World Health 
Report (WHO, 2005).   
Micro-Finance Framework 
Micro-finance offerings for healthcare encapsulate credit loans for emergency health situations, 
health savings accounts, and micro-insurance.  Loans are typically not a viable offering among MFIs due 
to the high default rate and consequent low sustainability (Schieber & Maeda, 1997).  A medical savings 
account mandates or encourages individuals to save and defines that the savings can only be spent for 
health costs of the owner or family.  However, medical savings accounts, offered through MFIs do not 
facilitate risk pooling among income levels, health status levels or by age and gender groups.  Also, the 
protection available is limited to the balance of the savings.  Microinsurance, referring to community-
funded health insurance schemes, is a mechanism for pooling resources and spreading risks across 
income, age, gender, or health status differences of the entire group (Preker et al., 2001).  The major 
difference is that the responsibility for the health risk is placed exclusively on the beneficiary and his 
family in the case of savings accounts, whereas microinsurance creates a system of complementary 
responsibility of individuals and their community; and the focus of this microfinance analysis will be on 
the latter.   
Micro-Insurance 
Evolving from this landscape of small credit offerings is microinsurance, birthed from the 
presence of social capital – when hardships surface, family and community often serve as the sole safety 
net for low-income populations.  In addition, low-income families often hold greater trust in community 
organizations and feel more confident contributing to a community-based financing program, which has 
an established positive track record for local impact, rather than to one that operates a broad-based 
national or regional (state or provincial) health insurance scheme.   
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The “micro” aspect refers to the smaller pool that micro-finance must work with, at a 
community level.  Ideally, insurers want a larger pool because size adds viability.  However, in 
developing countries, health insurers in reality do not want to include poverty-stricken population 
segments in larger pools, due to lower income, higher health risk, and higher default rates.  In addition, 
the social structure has excluded disadvantaged populations from access to larger schemes (Dror, 
Radermacher, Koren, 2007).  As a result of these two constraints, microinsurance units operate to give 
the target destitute population to express its needs and priorities in terms of offerings, and also strive to 
develop a positive opinion toward insurance.  The consulting process is essential to the concept of group 
involvement in self-management that is pivotal in microfinance offerings; the community’s and its 
individual members’ interests are correlated.  Hence, a successful microinsurer must work with the 
population and the members’ priorities, rather than simply providing financial resources.  This also helps 
to build trust and maintain the microinsurance system as a socially and community-rooted organization, 
rather than one that is responding to an external insurer’s profit motives.  This in turn would lead to a 
larger continued membership, theoretically, which generates more resources than a smaller one, 
enabling the group to cover expenses that a single individual could not afford.   
Study Data and Methods 
The dataset used is the 2004 Indian National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) survey data on 
Household Consumer Expenditure (Schedule 1.0) and Morbidity and Healthcare (Schedule 25.0).  
Previous research used the World Health Survey (WHS) Datasets for select developing countries to 
determine the potential for health insurance.  However, the main limitation of WHS data for India is the 
lack of month-to-month and annual health expenses, which is necessary for a predicted measure of 
variance in spending.  The sampling was also limited in regions and number of households surveyed.  
Previously and in this research, the annual measure is simulated to be 12 times monthly expenditures, 
which assumes a variance for the distribution.  In the NSSO Morbidity and Healthcare dataset, 
individuals’ self-reported health status and disease condition is available.  This can be used to determine 
the demand for insurance for chronic conditions as well as the potential for catastrophic coverage.   
The final household-level data sets combines information on household health spending, total 
spending, and demographic and health information on the household survey respondent as well as from 
other individuals in the household.  All expenditures are at a household level; individual health spending 
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or individual total spending is not available, except for hospitalizations resulting from specific ailments, 
which is available in the Healthcare and Morbidity dataset.   
The analyses require an income measure, because health spending in developing countries has 
been shown to vary by income segment (Pauly, Blavin, Meghan, 2009).  Due to data limitations of 
wealth indication measures (e.g. ownership of a bicyucle, home, and so forth), the NSSO analysis for 
India delineates income based on a spending based definition.  This is defined to be total actual 
consumption less actual medical care spending for each household.  This serves to stratify the 
population by income quintiles.  Health expenditure data is the second piece, in which monthly and/or 
biweekly data is compared with the annual reported values or estimates, to subsequently calculate the 
projected insurance premium.  Health spending is available for inpatient, outpatient, and outpatient 
drug expenses.  The insurance premium calculation is used to gauge whether there is a demand for 
insurance, through a comparison to current out-of-pocket expenditures.   
Risk Premium Calculation 
Risk premium ≈  0.5 ×
𝑟 𝐼 
𝐼
  × 𝜎2 
Where r(I) is the relative risk-aversion coefficient, I is income, and σ2 (the square of the standard 
deviation σ) is the variance of the residual for the risky distribution (Phelps, 2003).   
 
In order to identify which segments of a population have higher levels of drug spending, 
regression models are generated.  Drug spending in a 30-day period (Schedule 1.0 Consumer 
Expenditure dataset) was regressed by income quintiles, region (urban or rural), the presence of an 
elderly person (elderly defined as age greater than 59 years), number of children (age less than 17 
years), household size, and whether or not there was a hospitalization in the past 365 days.  Drug 
spending in a 15-day period (Schedule 25.0 Health Care and Morbidity Dataset) was regressed by 
income quintiles, region, marital status (single or partner), education level, gender, age groups, and self-
reported specific ailments – that either (1) were present during the past 15 days or (2) led to 
hospitalization during the last 365 days.   
Results 
Analysis of annual mean income (spending-based definition) and health expenditure ($ PPP) for 
inpatient care and non-institutional expenses resulted in average expenditures that are positive for all 
income quintiles, as shown in Exhibit 1.  The share of spending by the bottom 80% of households on the 
basis of income is 42% for inpatient medical expenses, 57% for non-institutional medical expenses, 58% 
for drugs, and 55% for physician fees.  The share of spending by the bottom 40% of households on the 
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basis of income is 10% for inpatient medical expenses, 17% for non-institutional medical expenses, 18% 
for drugs, and 16% for physician fees.  For the first income quintile, the average income is 1483($ PPP) 
and the inpatient medical expenses was 17, non-institutional medical expenses is 52 overall, and within 
which is 45 for drugs, and 5 for physician fees.  For the second income quintile, the average income is 
2541($ PPP) and the inpatient medical expenses is 25, non-institutional medical expenses is 109 overall, 
and within which is 93 for drugs, and 11 for physician fees.   
Exhibit 1 
Annual Mean Income and Health Spending ($ PPP) for Inpatient Medical Expenses, Non-
Institutional Medical Expenses, Prescription Drugs, and Physician Fees in All Households 
 
Note: PPP is purchasing power parity.   
 
The calculated risk premium is determined based on the mean spending, the variance of 
spending, and the coefficient of risk aversion enumerated as 2.0.  Represented as a percentage of the 
mean health spending, the market demand for feasible insurance can be delineated.  The theory of 
insurance demand predicts that risk-averse households will voluntarily opt for insurance if it can be 
offered to them at a premium whose excess over the expected expenses is smaller than the “risk 
premium” they would be willing to pay (Phelps, 2003).  As a percentage of mean spending, the risk 
premium for the entire population, across income quintiles is 227% for inpatient medical expenses, 35% 
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for non-institutional medical expenses, within which it is calculated to be 29% for drugs only, and 10% 
for physician fees only, as shown in Exhibit 2.  This pattern of a feasible percentage for inpatient medical 
expenses and low percentage and market potential for non-institutional expenses (drugs and physician 
fees) is paralleled for the bottom two income quintiles, for which it is 260% and 89% for inpatient 
medical spending, 46% and 44% for non-institutional spending, 39% and 40% for drugs only, and 13% 
and 9% for physician fees only, for the first and second income quintiles respectively.    
Exhibit 2 
Annual Calculated Risk Premium ($ PPP) for Inpatient Medical Expenses, Non-Institutional Medical 
Expenses, Prescription Drugs, and Physician Fees in All Households 
 
Note: PPP is purchasing power parity.   
 
To further investigate the potential role of insurance coverage for drug spending, 30-day drug 
spending was regressed by household attributes that might increase the predisposition for higher level 
of expenses: regional situation (urban or rural), presence of an elderly person (defined as 60 years and 
older), number of children (defined as less than 17 years), number of household members, and whether 
there was a hospitalization in the past 365 days.  In the Consumer Expenditure survey, in the final 
dataset, 11,914 households report 0 drug spending in the past 30 days.  A probit regression was first 
used to model this spending distribution to control for the high number of households with no drug 
expenditures.  All explanatory variables are significant.  Geographic situation in a rural area is significant 
with a coefficient of -0.09, standard error of 0.02 and z-statistic of -5.45, meaning that the drug spending 
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is predicted to be higher if a household is in a rural region.  Presence of elderly is significant with a 
coefficient of 0.25, standard error of 0.02, and z-statistic was 14.35.  Number of children is significant 
with a coefficient of -0.02, standard error of 0.01 and z-statistic of -3.21.  Household size is significant 
and has a coefficient of 0.03 with a standard error of 0.01 and z-statistic of 5.31.  Hospitalization is 
significant with a coefficient of -0.05, standard error of 0.02, and z-statistic of -2.16.   
Exhibit 3 
Probit Regression ($ PPP) for 30-day Drug Spending in All Households:  
Effects of Income, Region, Household Age Structure, and Hospitalization 
 
Note: PPP is purchasing power parity.   
 
Following up the probit regression, an OLS regression model was built including only those 
households with positive drug spending.  Parallel to the earlier model, all explanatory variables in the 
models are significant.  Approximately 42% of households included in the models have a predicted level 
of drug spending higher than the actual mean spending during the 30-day period, as shown in Exhibit 4.    
Geographic situation in a rural area is significant with a coefficient of -134, standard error of 43 and z-
statistic of -3.1, meaning that the drug spending is predicted to be higher if a household is in a rural 
region.  Presence of elderly is significant with a coefficient of 311, standard error of 42, and z-statistic 
was 7.3.  Number of children is significant with a coefficient of -47, standard error of 17 and z-statistic of 
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-2.7.  Household size is significant and has a coefficient of 32 with a standard error of 12 and z-statistic 
of 2.7.  Hospitalization is significant with a coefficient of 624, standard error of 55, and z-statistic of 11.3.  
The main discrepancy between the probit and OLS regression models, including and excluding 
households with no drug spending, respectively, is the coefficient of hospitalization, which is negative 
and significant when households with no drug spending are included, and positive and significant when 
only positive-spending households are included.   
Exhibit 4 
OLS Regression for 30-day Drug Spending in Households with Positive Drug Spending:  
Effects of Income, Region, Household Age Structure, and Hospitalization 
   
The Healthcare and Morbidity (Schedule 25.0) dataset provides information on specific health 
ailments of individuals in the household.  Health spending was regressed by socio-demographic controls 
(income, age, household size, urban sector, education level, gender) and followed by models that 
included the specific ailments and whether (Model 1) the ailment existed in the past 15 days, and 
(Model 2) whether the ailment led to hospitalization in the past 365 days, as shown in Exhibit 5.  This 
analysis highlights that ailments found to be significant can also often be categorized as chronic or 
accidental cases.   
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Exhibit 5 
OLS Regression ($ PPP) for Annual Out-of-Pocket Hospital Spending in All Households for Specific 
Ailments and Consequent Hospitalizations During the Last 365 Days 
 
 
 
Model 1:  Controls Added for Specific 
Ailments in HH During Last 15 Days 
Model 2:  Controls Added Specific  
Ailments in HH that Led to Hospitalization 
During Last 365 Days 
 Coef. Std. Err t-stat Coef. Std. Err t-stat 
       
R-Squared 0.0339 0.1673 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.1667 
Root MSE 828.35 769.03 
       
Inc. Quintile 1 -16.6 10.9 -1.5 -6.1 10.2 -0.6 
Inc. Quintile 2 -3.5 9.9 -0.4 -0.1 9.2 0.0 
Inc. Quintile 4 40.6 10.0 4.0 18.0 9.3 1.9 
Inc. Quintile 5 152.0 11.8 12.9 100.3 11.0 9.2 
Household Size 3.5 1.6 2.2 -0.6 1.5 -0.4 
Urban Sector -10.5 7.9 -1.3 -8.0 7.3 -1.1 
Single -0.4 10.8 0.0 19.9 10.0 2.0 
Edu. Level 0 -30.8 7.9 -3.9 -2.3 7.4 -0.3 
Edu. Level 1 -19.8 10.8 -1.8 -11.1 10.0 -1.1 
Edu. Level 3 18.3 10.4 1.8 34.1 9.7 3.5 
Edu. Level 4 59.4 13.6 4.4 91.7 12.6 7.3 
Male 18-34 1.9 8.5 0.2 2.3 7.9 0.3 
Male >49 44.7 7.7 5.8 19.3 7.1 2.7 
Female 18-34 9.8 24.3 0.4 10.2 22.5 0.5 
Female 34-49 30.1 18.2 1.7 14.9 16.9 0.9 
Female >49 38.0 17.0 2.2 2.2 15.7 0.1 
Diarrhoea/ dysentery -14.9 21.3 -0.7 134.0 30.6 4.4 
Gastritis/ulcer 22.3 24.4 0.9 584.5 38.8 15.1 
Worm infestation -35.6 72.8 -0.5 457.6 125.6 3.6 
Amoebiosis -75.9 75.1 -1.0 263.4 142.8 1.8 
Hepatitis/Jaundice 106.1 68.3 1.6 772.1 63.1 12.2 
Heart disease 627.7 28.7 21.9 2217.2 38.1 58.1 
Hypertension 52.5 21.4 2.5 953.5 55.7 17.1 
Respiratory 15.6 19.2 0.8 552.8 48.4 11.4 
Tuberculosis 286.3 42.5 6.7 840.7 55.0 15.3 
Bronchial asthma 74.5 24.4 3.1 450.1 49.8 9.0 
Joints and bones 59.4 18.8 3.2 1095.0 51.8 21.2 
Kidney/urinary system 558.1 46.1 12.1 1331.6 41.5 32.1 
Prostatic disorders 294.3 127.5 2.3 1580.7 131.0 12.1 
Gynecological disorders 144.0 41.4 3.5 847.0 35.3 24.0 
Neurological disorders 326.7 32.5 10.1 1448.8 48.5 29.9 
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Model 1:  Controls Added for Specific 
Ailments in HH During Last 15 Days 
Model 2:  Controls Added Specific  
Ailments in HH that Led to Hospitalization 
During Last 365 Days 
 Coef. Std. Err t-stat Coef. Std. Err t-stat 
Psychiatric disorders 117.4 56.0 2.1 777.1 89.2 8.7 
Conjunctivitis 116.1 69.8 1.7 559.2 179.9 3.1 
Glaucoma 111.0 88.5 1.3 524.6 112.0 4.7 
Cataract -38.3 37.1 -1.0 291.5 48.2 6.1 
Diseases of skin 0.8 32.4 0.0 528.6 105.4 5.0 
Goitre -19.3 133.8 -0.1 421.8 259.0 1.6 
Diabetes mellitus 135.3 25.7 5.3 730.6 65.1 11.2 
Under-nutrition -59.0 129.1 -0.5 275.6 283.6 1.0 
Anaemia 9.5 69.3 0.1 363.2 84.7 4.3 
STDs 16.8 181.2 0.1 852.1 237.3 3.6 
Malaria 0.7 36.5 0.0 279.7 45.1 6.2 
Eruptive 61.5 76.0 0.8 402.3 172.9 2.3 
Mumps -111.3 95.7 -1.2 146.7 316.8 0.5 
Diphtheria -7.6 119.9 -0.1 641.0 170.4 3.8 
Whooping cough -9.6 30.9 -0.3 225.7 103.3 2.2 
Fever of unknown origin -14.3 11.9 -1.2 238.1 30.6 7.8 
Tetanus -7.7 247.0 0.0 1122.4 160.8 7.0 
Filariasis/Elephantiasis -22.2 130.4 -0.2 349.3 217.0 1.6 
Locomotor 28.2 34.3 0.8 1085.1 79.8 13.6 
Visual including blindness 
(excluding cataract) 
-22.4 45.1 -0.5 323.9 126.8 2.6 
Speech -65.8 89.7 -0.7 545.9 322.1 1.7 
Hearing -14.5 47.5 -0.3 1086.9 204.0 5.3 
Diseases of 
Mouth/Teeth/Gum 
-87.4 46.4 -1.9 687.1 163.2 4.2 
Accidents/Injuries/Burns/
Fractures/Poisoning 
258.3 28.1 9.2 1049.3 26.5 39.6 
Cancer and other 
tumours 
1440.8 62.8 23.0 2385.6 56.1 42.5 
Other diagnosed 
ailments 
57.6 13.1 4.4 748.7 20.8 36.0 
Other undiagnosed 
ailments 
-2.4 29.5 -0.1 504.4 66.7 7.6 
_cons 16.6 12.8 1.3 -24.0 11.8 -2.0 
 
Note: PPP is purchasing power parity.   
Due to data limitations, certain categorical nomenclature such as “Diseases of skin” is not 
discrete enough to classify as chronic or acute (e.g. skin diseases can be skin cancer or eczema).  
However, of those variables that are significant in the model to consider in-patient hospital spending 
and hospitalization resulting from the health condition, the following ailments can be noted as chronic: 
heart disease (z-stat = 58.1), hypertension (z-stat = 17.1), tuberculosis (z-stat = 15.3), bronchial asthma 
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(z-stat = 9.0), disorders of joints and bones (z-stat = 21.2), disease of kidney/urinary system (z-stat = 
32.1), prostatic disorders (z-stat = 12.1), neurological disorders (z-stat = 29.9), psychiatric disorders (z-
stat = 8.7), diabetes mellitus (z-stat = 11.2), cancers and other tumours (z-stat = 42.5).  In addition, 
catastrophic health conditions were also found to be significant in the model for hospitalizations in the 
past 365 days, and is categorized under “accidents/injuries/burns/fractures/poisoning” (z-stat = 39.6).   
Conclusions  
The household data are first stratified by income quintiles on the basis of total household 
monthly expenditures less health spending.  This generates analysis that will consider financial 
demarcations.  Spending has been shown to vary with income; therefore, insurance should be 
segmented by income (Pauly, Blavin, Meghan, 2009).  There are three main facets that have emerged 
from the analysis: (1) there is positive health spending, (2) the association between health spending and 
household demographic attributes, and (3) the association between health spending and specific health 
ailments.   
Based on the Consumer Expenditure household survey, the share of spending by the bottom 
40% of households on the basis of income is 10% for inpatient medical expenses, 17% for non-
institutional medical expenses, 18% for drugs, and 16% for physician fees.  For the first income quintile, 
the average income was 1483($ PPP) and the inpatient medical expenses was 17, non-institutional 
medical expenses was 52 overall, and within which was 45 for drugs, and 5 for physician fees.  For the 
second income quintile, the average income was 2541($ PPP) and the inpatient medical expenses was 
25, non-institutional medical expenses was 109 overall, and within which was 93 for drugs, and 11 for 
physician fees.  The data analysis of the Consumer Expenditure household survey showcases that 
positive health spending exists, across income groups, including the bottom two quintiles.   
The risk premium calculation, derived from the mean expenditure and variance, based on a risk 
aversion coefficient of 2 provides a theoretical projection of insurance premium.  Alan Garber and 
Charles Phelps have identified that a risk-aversion coefficient of 2.0 represents the central tendency of 
estimates generated from insurance studies (Garber and Phelps, 1997).  The risk premium is then 
measured as a percentage of the mean expenditure in order to determine if feasibly offered insurance 
will be demanded.  The theory of insurance demand predicts that risk-averse households will voluntarily 
opt for insurance if it can be offered to them at a premium whose excess over the expected expenses is 
smaller than the “risk premium” they would be willing to pay (Phelps, 2003).  As a percentage of mean 
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spending, the risk premium for the entire population, across income quintiles is 227% for inpatient 
medical expenses, 35% for non-institutional medical expenses, within which it is calculated to be 29% 
for drugs only, and 10% for physician fees only.  This pattern of a feasible percentage for inpatient 
medical expenses and low percentage and market potential for non-institutional expenses (drugs and 
physician fees) is paralleled for the bottom two income quintiles, suggesting that there is market 
demand for insurance that covers inpatient hospital care but less demand due to low variance of 
expenses for non-institutional expenses, namely prescription drugs and outpatient physician fees.  The 
risk premium is determined based on the variance of the losses that the insurance will be able to cover 
as well as the household’s risk aversion.  Demand for insurance will be low if variance of the losses is 
small or if the administrative “loading” (amount charged that does not provide for medical expense 
reimbursement but rather serves to compensate the offering and processing of insurance) in excess of 
the premium is high (Pauly and Zweifel, 2006).  This is one of the main reasons that insurance must be 
offered and operated in an efficient manner.  Micro health insurance in particular can benefit from the 
financial knowledge and operating proficiencies of more experienced financial institutions.   
The market potential for drug insurance was further investigated through regression models of 
30-day drug spending by geographic household situation (urban or rural), the presence of elderly 
(greater than 59 years), number of children (less than 17 years), household size, and whether there was 
a hospitalization during the last year.  The probit regression was first modelled to control for the high 
number of households that reported zero drug spending (11,914 households).  Following this model, an 
OLS regression model was built, which included the sample of only households with positive drug 
spending.  The main discrepancy between the probit and OLS regression models, including and excluding 
households with zero drug spending, respectively, is the coefficient of hospitalization, which is negative 
and significant when households with no drug spending are included, and positive and significant when 
only positive-spending households are included.  Hospitalization is however, generally not a predictive 
variable in an insurance model (it cannot be known if a household will have a member hospitalized or 
not in any given year, though it may be suggested from other factors such as a specific health condition).  
Therefore, the role of hospitalization in this model was to serve the purpose of identifying whether 
follow-up care through drugs was administered as a result of a hospitalization; in the OLS model, 
hospitalization is significant with a coefficient of 624, standard error of 55, and z-statistic of 11.3.   
In the OLS regression model which includes only those households with positive drug spending, 
all household explanatory variables in the models are found to be significant.  Approximately 42% of 
households included in the models have a predicted level of drug spending higher than the actual mean 
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spending during the 30-day period.    Geographic situation in a rural area is significant with a coefficient 
of -134, standard error of 43 and z-statistic of -3.1, meaning that the drug spending is predicted to be 
higher if a household is in a rural region.  The reasoning for this is unclear but can be explained 
potentially by the categorization of drugs and whether homeopathic or ayurvedic drugs, which are more 
prevalent in less formal, more rural areas in India are categorized as drugs (Kent et al., 2006).  In 
addition, due to the lower levels of pharmaceutical infrastructure in rural areas, both in terms of 
availability as well as quality (and authenticity), greater expenditures may not necessarily equate to 
higher levels of health outcomes (Peters et al., 2002).  Presence of elderly is significant with a coefficient 
of 311, standard error of 42, and z-statistic was 7.3; this  can be explained by the increased health 
complications that result from old age, including increased vulnerability but also greater immobility to 
access care.  Number of children is significant with a coefficient of -47, standard error of 17 and z-
statistic of -2.7, suggesting that households with greater number of children have lower drug spending.  
While this may seem contrary to intuition, it can be explained by two main underlying aspects.  Firstly, 
greater number of children may be a predictor of a household’s socio-economic status, including 
consideration for the household’s primary occupation, such as one that is more labor intensive and can 
benefit from more number of people.  As well, more number of children may also reflect the limited 
access to birth control or other health and social services (Peters et al., 2002).  Secondly, there may be a 
substitution effect in terms of allocation of finite financial resources with greater number of children to 
care for, which may crowd out drug spending.  Household size is significant and has a coefficient of 32 
with a standard error of 12 and z-statistic of 2.7; this is parallel to household size and subsequent risk 
premiums paid and drug spending in developed economies as well (Dror, Radermacher and Koren, 
2007).   
The Healthcare and Morbidity dataset offers information on individuals’ health ailments that 
were present during the past 15 days, as well as whether they led to a hospitalization in the past 365 
days.  These variables were included in a model to predict in-patient hospital spending at an annual 
level.  Data limitations from the original dataset constrains the degree to which each health ailment can 
be classified as chronic, acute, minor, or catastrophic.  For example, certain categorical nomenclature 
such as “Diseases of skin” is not discrete enough to classify as chronic or acute (e.g. skin diseases can be 
skin cancer or eczema). Basic medical knowledge as well as the World Health Organization’s 
categorization of health ailments was used to confirm certain health conditions as chronic as related to 
health spending (WHO, 2000).  Based on this elementary classification, of those variables that are 
significant in the model to consider in-patient hospital spending and hospitalization resulting from the 
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health condition, the following ailments can be noted as chronic: heart disease (z-stat = 58.1), 
hypertension (z-stat = 17.1), tuberculosis (z-stat = 15.3), bronchial asthma (z-stat = 9.0), disorders of 
joints and bones (z-stat = 21.2), disease of kidney/urinary system (z-stat = 32.1), prostatic disorders (z-
stat = 12.1), neurological disorders (z-stat = 29.9), psychiatric disorders (z-stat = 8.7), diabetes mellitus 
(z-stat = 11.2), cancers and other tumours (z-stat = 42.5).  In addition, catastrophic health conditions 
were also found to be significant in the model for hospitalizations in the past 365 days, and is 
categorized under “accidents/injuries/burns/fractures/poisoning” (z-stat = 39.6).  These findings suggest 
that a framework for offering health insurance would be particularly attractive from a demand 
standpoint for those households with individuals with a chronic health condition.  In addition, as 
supported by the mean health spending analyses as well as the projected insurance risk premium 
measures based on the variance of spending, catastrophic health insurance coverage also holds market 
potential.   
Microfinance Framework 
Improved access to care can guide improved quality of care, which in turn can lead to better 
health outcomes.  Improved health can lead to positive economic outcomes for households.  Coverage 
of medical expenditures that result from catastrophic health shocks through micro-health insurance can 
prevent people from selling off productive assets, depleting savings, and reducing spending and 
investments in children’s health and education in order to afford health spending.  By ensuring that the 
medical expenditures are paid, micro-health insurance can facilitate allocation of financial resources so 
that households can make other alternate and additional investments, which will contribute to asset 
accumulation and earnings.   
The microfinance framework could facilitate health insurance through local community 
organizations and this would enable reach to informal sectors of the economy as well as more rural 
regions in which the financial infrastructure of banking and insurance has not been established.  
Furthermore, microinsurance can leverage the social capital that exists in smaller and more destitute 
communities, which would ease adoption of the insurance concept.  Otherwise, the concept of paying 
an upfront premium for future financial protection is not a wholly known or accepted concept (Dror et 
al., 2007).   
Future Direction 
A risk premium based on monthly household health spending data, relative to household 
monthly income or total consumption expenditures, can serve as an upper bound for risk premia for a 
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longer duration; this is because the variance of spending relative to the mean should decline as longer 
time periods are considered.  This line of thought assumes that the month-to-month expenses for a 
household are not perfectly correlated.  Given this, the aim would be to estimate health spending, 
particularly drug expenditures, for which the current analysis suggests that insurance would not be 
feasible from a market demand perspective, at a longer time scale, such as an annual measure.   
Current analysis suggests that drug insurance is not feasible because the premia are too low 
given a low variance in spending.  It would therefore also be essential to identify socio-demographic and 
other household attributes that might potentially increase a household’s predisposition to higher levels 
of drug spending, thereby identify those household segments for which insurance would be viable.  The 
sample can be stratified on the basis of income, presence of elderly persons, number of children, 
household size, region (urban or rural), and specific health ailments, for those households that have a 
significantly high level of drug spending.  Catastrophic health expenditure is defined with respect to the 
households’ ability to pay.  Health spending is classified as catastrophic when a household must reduce 
its basic expenses over a certain period of time in order to cope with the medical bills of one or more of 
its members.  WHO proposes that health expenditure should be categorized as catastrophic whenever it 
is greater than or equal to 40% of the capacity to pay.  Catastrophic health expenditure is only observed 
when households need and use health services; therefore, only households with positive health 
spending can be analyzed, because access (though potentially limited in quality and quantity and 
geographical or financial barriers), at least to a certain extent, can be assumed.   
Annual spending can be estimated by taking each month of spending within an income quintle 
as an independent draw and defining the probability of a high expense in following months as low if the 
survey month expense is high.  With the health ailments data, households can be categorized as having 
a chronic condition present or not, and the subsequent risk premia for those two segments can be 
calculated.  Those households with chronic conditions can have a higher probability of a higher expense 
in subsequent months, and at an annual level (12 times survey month expenditure) and total spending 
for the rest of the sample can be simulated on the basis of independence between months.  This would 
be stratified and regressed within different income brackets (classified on a total consumption without 
health spending basis).   
Policy Implications 
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Health insurance is one of the most important policy issues today in the developing world.  
Developing countries suffer 90% of the global disease burden but represent only 12% of the world’s 
spending on health care (Wagstaff and Pradhan, 2005).  More than half of health expenditures in poor 
countries are out-of-pocket payments by individual households.  Health shocks and associated high 
medical expenses can cause destitute families to sell productive assets, such as agriculture necessary for 
earning a livelihood, or reduce consumption to the point where economic wellbeing is endangered and 
the famiy’s health and children’s educational opportunities are compromised (Gottret and Schieber, 
2006).   
There are two main branches of policy considerations to be analyzed: first, the market 
consequences of a household-level demand for insurance, and second, given a demand for health 
insurance, economically efficient strategies that will facilitate building a sustainable supply of 
microinsurance for health care.   
Demand for Voluntary Health Insurance 
The primary focus of this research is to determine the current level and variance of health 
spending in developing economies, in order to illustrate the current spending patterns.  This would 
imply that there is a role for insurance because if households already spend on healthcare, they would 
be able to instead pay a small insurance premium.  In addition, if there is sufficient variation in spending, 
individuals would benefit from risk and consumption smoothing over a time period.  As such, a case can 
be made for catastrophic healthcare coverage.  In addition, if a household currently expends a certain 
level of spending for health, then this further suggests that healthcare is a necessity and is demanded, as 
would be the situation for health insurance for chronic conditions.   
 Strategies for Offering Microinsurance 
There are various issues that have either hindered the growth of microinsurance’s client base, 
the efficacy of the health care received, as well as the types of health services that can be covered.  This 
analysis will examine strategies that would improve the model of micro health insurance in terms of its 
penetration, value to insured clients, and sustainability.  The primary focus moving forward would be to 
increase the population reach; this would facilitate greater number of people being provided with some 
level of financial health protection, and thereby also enlarge the risk pool.  
Reinsurance of Microinsurers 
Reinsurance of MFIs is based on the underlying idea that the insurers are able to underwrite 
risk.  It addresses the two main issues of a small risk pool as well as the shortage of reserve capital that 
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micro-insurers often face, threatening their sustainability and efficiency.  Micro-insurance units are 
rarely able to represent a perfectly balanced portfolio, between risk and return, either because their 
client volume is too small (either due to enrollment demand or capacity), or because the relatively large 
risks they cover among low-income populations represents a disproportionate impact on the portfolio 
as a whole.  In addition, various related insured events can result in a chain of losses with a compounded 
effect on the micro-insurer.  As a result of such adverse events, the balance of insured risks in the 
insurer’s portfolio is disrupted, and that consequently leads to discrepancies between the initial, 
probability-based forecast and the actual gross results (Dror, 2001).   
The four functions of reinsurance are all applicable to community-based health insurance funds: 
financing, capacity, stabilization of loss experience, and underwriting assistance (Dror, 2001).  From a 
financing perspective, reinsurance defines the amount of capital available to direct the insurance 
company to establish retention limits.  In terms of capacity, the coverage of large sums and highly 
exposed risks may require a limiting size of some accepted risks, by setting up boundaries for each type 
of risk, scaled down by the nature, severity, and past experience.  On a per risk basis, loss stabilization is 
achieved by calculating the risk of fluctuation and the risk of error in loss experience; on a per 
occurrence basis, loss experience is potentially stabilized by calculating the probability of a company’s 
risk of ruin by assuming a catastrophic event.  On the lines of underwriting, a key issue is the lack of 
expertise, which results in failing to establish optimal retention limits (Dror, 2001).   
The reinsurance model works on the theoretical basis of the law of large numbers and 
consequent risk smoothing.  The microinsurer pays the reinsurer a periodic premium, and in exchange, 
the reinsurer pays the microinsurer for costs exceeding a specified reinsurance threshold (Dror, 2001).  
Such reinsurance offers the micro-insurer the advantage of protection against the risk of bankruptcy in 
bad years and it also releases the microinsurer from unexpected fluctuations in expenses.  Therefore, 
since reinsurance removes the microinsurer’s obligation to maintain contingency funds, this allows the 
surpluses generated by the microinsurer in good years to be reinvested at its own discretion (Haggerty & 
Reid, 2002).  This would facilitate investment in consulting and financial advising services, health 
education for the microinsurer clients or to build partnerships with health care providers in the region.   
The Governmental Role  
The penetration of micro-insurance is very low currently in India.  An empirically calculated 
demand for health insurance among disadvantaged population segments could implicate a need for 
government and private insurers to enter the market.  In addition, this would provide greater support 
for government subsidy in the form of a rural or social sector mandate for private insurers through the 
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Insurance Regulation and Development Authority (IRDA).  Such a rural sector obligation has been 
proposed and implemented in India beginning in 2002, in which the mandate for life insurers is that in 
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th year the total number of policies written from ‘rural sector’ be 7, 9, 12, 14, 16 per 
cent respectively.  In the case of the general insurer, the obligation is to underwrite 2, 3, and 5 per cent 
of total gross premium income from the ‘rural sector’ in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd financial year respectively 
(IRDA, 2008).   
In addition, given the emergence of state-sponsored health schemes, microinsurance could 
serve as an extension of this arm, to reach the bottom income quintiles in an efficient manner.  The fit 
with government schemes would also include complementary benefits to ensure that health care 
services coverage is not duplicated and is offered most efficiently.  The calculated risk premiums can 
contribute to gauging the sustainability of micro-insurance units and whether micro-insurance is in fact 
a feasible initiative in the long run.  Currently, due to the small risk pool, micro-insurance requires 
subsidies to compensate during bad insurance years (negative profits); in this scenario, if there is 
demand for micro-insurance, reinsurance may be an important avenue to explore.   
A basic level of coverage, for catastrophic health expenditures at least, could potentially 
motivate the government or non-governmental organizations to invest in health care infrastructure, 
including facilities and health professionals, particularly in rural areas where access is limited.  Health 
care in rural India is sparse, in part, due to people’s inability to pay and subsequent low awareness or 
interest in formal health care services.  This is further exacerbated either due to high default of bill rates 
as a result of low income, or low demand for care in fear of high medical expenses (Kent et al., 2006).  
Partnerships with health providers could be established in the short term to ensure that there is a 
supply of care available.   
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